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Abstract  
 This paper addresses the question whether the institutional environment of transition 
countries in Eastern Europe affects productivity growth in the agricultural sector. Situated in a 
neoclassical growth framework, a dynamic panel model for the period 1996-2005 provides 
evidence that poor institutional quality leads to a slowdown in agricultural productivity 
growth. Productivity growth is limited by a high degree of corruption, which is of particular 
importance given that corruption has been proven to be most prevalent in Eastern European 
countries. Moreover, agricultural productivity in countries where privatisation and 
transferability of land is restricted is found to grow at a slower rate than countries supporting 
market-oriented land reforms. Interestingly, the results suggest that a high degree of openness 
leads to a loss in agricultural productivity, suggesting that timing and sequencing of trade 
reforms matter. An improvement of the poor institutional quality is thus of central importance 
to accelerate productivity growth in Eastern European countries. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
The development of agricultural output in the Eastern European countries in the last decade 
has proven to be an interesting field for research. To this effect, a number of researchers have 
tried to quantify the causes of output change in the former communist states. A profound 
empirical study by Macours and Swinnen (2000) has come to identify a multiplicity of 
variables impacting the agricultural output in Eastern European countries, such as weather, 
uncertainty, farm restructuring and privatisation. This study examines the coherence of 
additional theoretically well-founded variables with growth in agricultural productivity. 
Special attention is given to the role of the institutional environment, i.e. trade openness, 
corruption and its antithesis good governance, on the development of the agricultural growth 
in Eastern Europe. This in particular seems highly important as corruption and “bad 
governance” has been proven to be most prevalent in Eastern European countries (Sprout, 
2002).  
 
The paper is organised as follows. A brief overview of the development of agriculture in 
Eastern Europe given in the next Section precedes the upcoming empirical analysis in 
Section 3. Having shed light on the theoretical framework and the specific methodology used, 
Section 4 moves on to present the major findings of the empirical investigation and outlines 
their key implications. The paper concludes with a short summary of major findings in the 
final chapter.   
 
2  DEVELOPMENT OF THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN EASTERN EUROPE 
For the purpose of the present analysis Eastern Europe has been delimitated to ten countries, 
namely, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Slovakia and Ukraine, based on the United Nations Statistics Division’s proposed regional 
composition. How agriculture in this geographical region has developed, remains an 
important question to be addressed. Although the group of countries at study in many regards 
share homogenous traits, the development of agricultural productivity throughout the period 
considered from 1996 to 2005 shows a differential development. As Table 1 denotes, both 
level and growth of agricultural productivity in Eastern Europe show substantial differences. 
For the respective time period the average productivity growth in Bulgaria is recorded to be 
the highest among the selected set of countries, closely followed by Hungary and Romania. 
However, in terms of the agricultural output per worker, Hungary is found to be leading the 
group, narrowly followed by Bulgaria and at some marginal distance, the Czech Republic.   3











Belarus    4792178.1  695400  7.01  5.06 
Bulgaria    2871647.3  286400  10.45  6.03 
Czech 
Republic 
  3807906.6  462700  8.27  2.48 
Hungary    5532909.4  513000  10.93  5.91 
Moldova    1373093.0  491700  2.82  1.78 
Poland 16748626.0  4289700  3.91  1.48 
Romania    8099238.7  1564800  5.30  5.68 
Russia 38575728.0  8103100  4.80  3.10 
Slovakia    1633088.2  264700  6.18  1.75 
Ukraine 17113495.0  3552500 4.90  4.16 
Notes: I$ refers to International Dollars. All figures are annual averages over the period of the 
analysis. 
Source: FAO (2008a), own calculations.  
 
In view of the disparities among the countries displayed in Table 1, the question why some 
countries are more successful in improving agricultural labour productivity than others arises 
and calls for clarification. In his study on agricultural productivity in the European Union and 
Eastern Regions (Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Poland), Serrao (2003) identifies an 
impact of the Union’s Common Agricultural Policy not solely on members, but also on states 
having applied for a membership. Furthermore, he finds that the success of the Eastern 
European countries in his sample is closely related to a relatively high technical change over 
the period 1980-1998. Consistent with his results, except for Poland, Table 1 indicates highest 
productivity growth for Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, countries that were first to apply for 
an EU membership. Technology, having been identified as one crucial factor for productivity 
growth and as a reason for differences among Eastern European countries, addresses a 
fraction of the above stated question. Nevertheless, a multiplicity of factors has to be analysed 
when investigating the complex issue of productivity in agriculture, most notably when 
addressing the Eastern European region. This especially seems crucial in the case of formerly 
planned economies, where production targets were formulated in the national agendas for the 
purpose of achieving self-sufficiency. Moreover, in the centrally planned economy the policy 
of full employment was a key element. This led to an over-employment in the agricultural 
sector as well, consequently resulting in a reduction of the productivity levels. The degree of   4
success in implementing reforms in the agricultural sector which came along with the move 
towards more market orientation has varied across the Eastern European region (OECD, 
2001). The upcoming analysis tries to consider this multiplicity of factors impacting the 
growth in productivity in order to identify the isolated effect of poor institutional quality on 
productivity growth among the selected set of countries.  
 
3  METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Theoretical Framework  and Model Specification  
An appropriate framework to analyse productivity growth in Eastern Europe is the neo-
classical growth model first proposed by Solow (1956). Basically, the model is derived from a 
production function of a given country where productivity, i.e. output per worker, is 
determined by capital and labour growth rates as well as technology parameters. The general 
formulation of the production function is  ) , ( ) ( L K f t A Q =  where Q denotes the output, K  
and L are, respectively, capital and labour. The factor  ) (t A  measures productivity shifts over 
time which may be induced by technological progress or changes in the institutional 
environment. Following Rizov (2004), we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function with 
labour augmenting technological change. L and  A are assumed to grow exogenously at the 
rate of l and a, which denote the rate of employment growth and of technological progress in 
the agricultural sector.  
In order to implement the above framework consider the following model using conventional 
panel data notation 
i i it
it it it it it it it
LR OPEN
FDI CPI VA RQ AEG ALP GROWTH
δ β β
β β β β β β α
+ +









where  i δ  is the composite error term consisting of the time-invariant country-specific effects 
i α  and the idiosyncratic error term  it ε . An overview of the abbreviations, definitions and data 
sources is given in Table 2 and will be explained in greater detail in the next subsection. 
 
The use of panel data methodology offers the advantage of controlling for unobserved 
country-specific effects (the term  i α ) and thus allows accounting for heterogeneity across 
countries. Moreover, year-specific dummy variables are included in order to account for 
events with major impacts on agricultural production in the Eastern European region in a 
particular year, as for instance extreme weather events.    5
Table 2:  List of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable Definition  Data  Source 
GROWTH Productivity  growth defined as growth of 
agricultural output per worker (%) 
FAO (2008a) 
ALP  Agricultural labour productivity (‘000 
International Dollars) 
FAO (2008a) 
AEG Agricultural  employment growth (adjusted for 
the rate of technological progress and 
depreciation) (%) 
FAO (2008a) 
VA  Voice and Accountability (-2.5 lowest level, 2.5 
highest level of voice and accountability) 
World Bank (2008a) 
RQ  Regulatory Quality (-2.5 lowest level, 2.5 
highest level of regulatory quality) 
World Bank (2008a) 
CPI  Corruption Perception Index (0 highest level, 10 
lowest level of corruption) 
Transparency International 
(2008) 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment (Mio. US Dollars)  UNCTAD (2008) 
OPEN  Degree of Openness (%)  FAO (2008b), World Bank 
(2008b) 
LR  Land Reform (0 no market attributes, 10 ideal 
market attributes) 
Lerman et al. (2004) 
Source: Authors’ own composition. 
 
The literature on panel data basically proposes two different approaches to estimate the 
country-specific effects, the random effects (RE) and the fixed effects (FE) approach. The RE 
approach has the advantage of allowing for the estimation of time-constants variables, such as 
the type of land reform, and is thus considered as more appropriate. However, for the 
estimation coefficients to be unbiased, the RE model requires independence of the country-
specific effects and the explanatory variables (the so-called orthogonality assumption). In 
order to assure that the assumption holds true and the appropriate model specification is used, 
a Hausman test is carried out. As the null hypothesis of no correlation between the country-
specific effects and the regressors could not be rejected, a RE model is considered as the 
appropriate approach (Greene, 2008). Moreover, in order to detect misspecification problems 
the Durbin-Watson statistic modified by Bhargava et al. (1982) to test for serial correlation 
and the panel-adjusted Breusch-Pagan test to test for heteroscedasticity are carried out. The 
results clearly indicate the presence of both autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
Consequently, in order to ensure reliable statistical inference robust standard errors are 
calculated by use of Generalized Least Squares (GLS). 
   6
3.2 Data and Variables 
The dataset covers the period 1996-2005 for the selected set of Eastern European countries. 
As outlined above several explanatory variables are included in the model, which are chosen 
upon theoretical consideration explained in greater detail below. The selection of explanatory 
variables allows us to isolate the effects of changes in the institutional environment on 
productivity growth. Table 3 summarizes the basic descriptive statistics of explanatory 
variables. 
Table 3: Summary Statistics of the Variables (n = 100) 
Variable   Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
GROWTH (%)  3.74    9.54   -17.11   30.74   
ALP (1000I$)  6.46    2.80   2.34   14.50   
AEG (%)  -.04    .02   -.07   -.02   
CPI 3.54    .95   1.5   5.57   
VA .20    .79   -1.71   1.22   
RQ .05    .83   -2.01   1.24   
FDI (Mio US 
Dollars) 
2,901.94   3,241.53   23.74  15,444.37  
OPEN (%)  .81    .41   .12   1.59   
LR 8.04    2.53   1.3   10   
Note: Remaining units are explained in Table 2.  
Source: Authors’ own composition. 
 
The growth rate of the gross agricultural production per economically active individual of the 
same sector is taken as dependent variable, computed by dividing the gross agricultural 
production by the value of each year’s total economically active population in agriculture. 
In order to test for convergence across Eastern European transition countries the value of 
agricultural output per worker lagged by one year, i.e. the initial productivity, is chosen as 
explanatory variable. Moreover, the agricultural employment growth rate (calculated as the 
difference of the natural logarithms of agricultural employment) is included in the model. 
Following Rizov (2004), the employment growth rate l was adjusted to the rate of technical 
progress and depreciation as  ) ln( d a l + +  using 0.05 for a constant rate of technological 
progress and depreciation. 
   7
Moreover, the following variables are included as proxies of technological progress and the 
institutional environment incorporated in the factor  ) (t A . We use the inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) as a measure for investments, which allows accounting for enhanced 
agricultural productivity through spill-over effects and technology transfers between sectors 
which are not covered by sector-specific investments. As such, FDI is of central importance 
for transition economies in Eastern Europe to achieve convergence through improving their 
productivity and competitiveness (Sohinger, 2005). 
 
The model specification is further augmented by including governance indicators representing 
changes in the institutional environment (included in factor  ) (t A ). Good governance 
indicators are the corruption perception index, voice and accountability, and regulatory 
quality, with the latter being obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indictors database 
based on Kaufmann et al. (2008). As already mentioned in the introduction, these measures 
are most essential for an empirical analysis in the case of Eastern Europe, which has been 
ranking worst at these scales. 
 
The history of the Soviet states has shown that closed borders lead to inefficient production 
due to neglecting comparative advantages in production as well as reduced exchange of 
technology and knowledge. As markets open up it is generally expected to be followed by an 
increase in productivity. Thus, the degree of openness defined as 
AGR AGR AGR GDP EXP IMP / ) ( +  in included in the model as a proxy for  ) (t A .  
 
Finally, the analysis employs an alternative measure for land reform which has not been 
commonly used in previous studies, namely the Composite Land Policy Index proposed by 
the Lerman et al. (2004). This index in aggregate provides an overview of the different 
developments in the selected sample with respect to potential private ownership, privatization 
strategy, allocation strategy and transferability of land. 
 
4  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In general the statistical tests show that the model has a quite satisfactory explanatory power 
over productivity growth in the Eastern European countries’ agricultural sector. The detailed 
results of the models estimated, reported in Table 4, show that the differences in the results 
between the models are minimal. 
   8
Table 4: Estimation Results (dependent variable = productivity growth in %) 














































































Log-Likelihood -310.89  -311.06  -312.10 
Observations 100 100 100 
Notes: Standard errors are robust to heteroscedastic and contemporaneous correlated 
disturbances. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Results for year-specific dummy variables are not reported.  
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Within the selected set of countries, the significant and positive coefficient of the lagged value 
of agricultural output per worker indicates that countries with a higher initial agricultural 
productivity generally have a higher rate of productivity growth. That is to say, the results 
provide evidence that productivity across Eastern European countries diverge, contrasting the 
results of many other studies finding convergence across Eastern European countries (see for 
instance Rizov, 2004). This difference to other studies may be due to the particular set of   9
countries included in the analysis. It is reasonable to argue that countries neither supported by 
the EU (at least not in a comparable extent as accession candidates) nor in close proximity to 
the EU, such as Belarus, face high difficulties in increasing agricultural productivity. In 
contrast, the agricultural sector of EU member countries, as for instance Romania and 
Bulgaria, are likely to grow at a more rapid rate due to considerable support of the EU in the 
pre- and post-accession phase.  
 
As expected, the significantly negative coefficient of agricultural employment growth 
suggests that a negative growth of employment in the agricultural sector increases the output 
per worker. The reduction of dispensable employment in the agricultural sector has thus a 
major impact on productivity growth.  
 
As the impact of good governance on productivity growth is concerned, the analysis suggests 
that only corruption has a significant negative effect on productivity growth in the agricultural 
sector, whereas no consistent evidence is provided that other good governance indicators 
influence productivity growth. The results clearly indicate that an increase in the Corruption 
Perception Index, which is interpreted as a reduction in the corruption level, has a positive 
impact on productivity growth. Moreover, this finding implies that farm level changes in the 
organisational structure and management additionally have to be supplemented by the 
creation of supporting commercial and public infrastructure as well as institutions that a 
market-driven agricultural system requires. Such an infrastructure involves, for example, 
systems of credit, market information, and commercial law (Liefert and Swinnen, 2002). If 
the regulatory quality in these institutions is weak and transparency is missing, corruption can 
easily infect these channels and thus undermine the required institutional quality for 
substantial productivity increases. For a sustainable productivity growth in the Eastern 
European region anti-corruption measures will play a significant role. If they are not 
implemented effectively, corruption will distort the market outcome and divert costs to the 
weak private sector, hampering growth. 
 
The expectation that a high degree of openness is associated with higher productivity growth  
cannot be confirmed by the analysis. In contrast, the results slightly suggest that the opening  
of markets actually led to a slowdown in productivity growth. Although this result seems to 
be contra intuitive at first sight, it may hint to inappropriate timing and sequencing of trade 
reforms in Eastern Europe (for a discussion of this issue see for instance Falvey and Kim,   10
1992, and Greenaway, 1998). Reforms that quickly liberalise the agricultural sector may deter 
farmers from undertaking necessary adjustments. In this context Goletti and Chabot (2000) 
find that the grain sector in Kazakhstan was severely hurt by a preceding liberalisation of the 
input sector, leading to a duplication of grain prices within one year. That is to say, an 
inappropriate sequence of reforms – especially when accompanied by institutional weakness – 
may lead to a deterioration of productivity of the agricultural sector as a whole. However, as 
the analysis focuses on aggregate agricultural productivity growth without accounting for 
differences across the range of production activities, a detailed examination of determinants 
and agricultural reforms of specific production activities is required to shed more light on the 
issue of timing and sequencing in Eastern Europe.  
 
As another interesting result, the coefficient of FDI is found to be not significant, implying 
that the agricultural sector is isolated from the rest of the economy. As a consequence, 
agricultural production does not profit from technological progress in other sectors through 
technology spill-over. 
 
Finally, the analysis finds that the nature of land reforms matter. In line with Lerman (1998) 
and Rizov (2004) it can be shown that land reforms strengthening market attributes, most 
importantly private ownership of land, transferability of property and use rights as well as 
land allocation in the form of physical plots or paper shares, are most likely to improve 
productivity in the agricultural sector. In contrast, countries which supported less market-
oriented land reforms – or even no land reform at all, as in the case of Belarus – are hampered 
in their ability to increase agricultural productivity.  
 
5  SUMMARY AND MAJOR CONCLUSION  
The transition economies in Eastern European are characterised by a persisting high degree of 
corruption and “bad governance”. The poor institutional environment is expected to be a 
major limitation in the path of transition. In this context, the paper empirically investigates 
whether a poor institutional environment leads to a slowdown of productivity growth in the 
agricultural sector in the Eastern European region. Embedded in the framework of Solow’s 
neoclassical growth model, a theoretically well-founded dynamic panel model is proposed to 
analyse the relationship between institutional quality and productivity growth. In order to 
isolate the effect of institutional environment on agricultural productivity several factors 
influencing productivity in Eastern Europe are extracted from the literature.    11
 
In general, the results provide strong evidence that the poor institutional quality in Eastern 
Europe is one major limitation of productivity growth in these countries. Especially countries 
with highest degrees of corruption are found to have a significantly lower productivity 
growth. Moreover, countries which failed to implement privatisation and transferability of 
land are handicapped from a lower growth in agricultural productivity compared to those 
countries supporting market-oriented land reforms. Surprisingly, a negative impact of 
openness on agricultural productivity is found which may be owed to sequencing problems of  
trade reforms in Eastern Europe. However, to come to a final conclusion the issue of timing 
and sequencing has to be analysed in greater detail.  
 
In line with previous studies investigating the determinants of transition in Eastern European 
agriculture, the cutback of dispensable employment in the agricultural sector after the 
breakdown of the centrally planned system is found to increase productivity growth to a 
considerable extent. Moreover, the results provide evidence that agricultural productivity in 
the Eastern European region diverges, meaning that countries with low initial productivity 
face particularly high difficulties to catch up.  
 
Overall, the study finds that an improvement of the poor institutional quality is central in 
accelerating productivity growth in Eastern European countries. Thereby priority should be 
given to the reduction of the persisting high level of corruption. Besides the reduction of 
corruption, a stronger linkage of the agricultural sector to the rest of the economy is important  
in order to ensure that agricultural production profits from technology spill-over. Finally, 
attention should also be paid to an appropriate timing and sequencing of reforms in order to 
avoid market distortions which may adversely affect the productivity in the agricultural sector  
and, eventually, Eastern European farmers’ competitiveness on international markets. 
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